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1. The urgency of the matter
Nicholas Stern (2008) writes, “Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are externalities
and represent the biggest market failure that the world has seen.” The simplest proxy
for the damage caused by GHG emissions is global temperature. It is not temperature,
as such, that is the problem: rather, it is the consequences of higher temperature
concerning water that can be disastrous. A rise of global temperature by 50C. would
bring about a massive increase in the intensity of storms and of drought, as well as a rise
of the sea level by perhaps 10 meters. It is not unlikely that at least half of earth’s species
would be wiped out.
Global temperature is a function of the stock of carbon equivalent in the
atmosphere. Currently, that stock is 430 parts per million CO2 , written “430 ppm
CO2e.” If the stock is stabilized at 450 ppm, then climate scientists estimate that global
temperature will stabilize at somewhere between 10 C. and 3.80 C. above the current
temperature, where this represents a 90% confidence interval. (That is, with probability
0.9, the temperature will stabilize somewhere in the interval [10 , 3.8 0 ] above where it is
now.) If stabilization occurs at 550 ppm, the 0.9 confidence interval for global
temperature is [1.5 0 , 5.2 0 ] . The large lengths of these intervals reflect the uncertainty in
our knowledge of the effect of carbon emissions on temperature, which is a highly
complex process, involving feedbacks of various kinds of uncertain magnitudes. (How
much do the deep oceans absorb carbon from the air?) The world’s largest computers are
currently being used to simulate these effects.

*

Most of the ideas presented here come from a collaboration with Joaquim Silvestre and
Humberto Llavador on the problem of intergenerational welfare in a warming planet.
The paper reports some of the conclusions from our joint work, referenced below. I
thank Geir Asheim for comments.
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If we continue with ‘business as usual,’ that is, without controlling emissions
more than we currently do, we will reach at least 750 ppm CO2e by the end of this
century. The 0.9 confidence interval associated with 750 ppm is [2.2 0 C, 6 0 C] warmer
than today. Life as we know it would end on the planet.
Currently climatology says that it is impossible completely to stabilize the level of
carbon concentration in the atmosphere unless emissions become zero, something which
is not feasible. (See Matthews and Caldeira [2008].) The key question therefore
becomes how rapidly concentration increases. If emissions are cut drastically, then the
stock of atmospheric carbon will increase slowly, and human society will have time to
adjust. If we reach an increase in temperature of 5 0 C . in 5000 years, we will have
plenty of time to move our cities to the polar regions, which by then will be pleasantly
warm (snow and glaciers will have disappeared, along with polar bears).
These facts raise two important ethical issues – of intertemporal and intratemporal
justice.

Carbon emissions are a public bad: How should rights to produce that bad be

allocated over the present and future generations of man? That is the intertemporal
issue; the intratemporal one is how the rights to emit carbon should be allocated across
nations today, in the present and next generation. The proper solution of the second
problem presupposes the solution to the first. If we solve the intertemporal problem,
then we know the emissions ethically permitted for our generation. We then can ask
how that permitted amount should be allocated across nations today.
In this paper, I focus upon the intertemporal ethical issues and their consequences
for policy.

I will offer in section 8 some comments on the intratemporal question, but a

fuller study of that question is left for the future.

2. Arguments for discounted utilitarianism
The topic of the evaluation of social welfare in an intertemporal context is a wellworked one in welfare economics; the literature, of a formal sort, begins with Frank
Ramsey’s (1928) famous paper. I will summarize Ramsey’s contribution presently as it
has been applied to the climate-change problem.
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The problem in its general form can be stated as follows. First, we adopt a model
where each generation is represented by a single agent: that is, we abstract away from
distributional issues of humans who live contemporaneously. One can think of the
single agent as being the ‘average person.’
Let us represent the amenities available to an agent at date t as a vector zt .
Components of this vector are consumption, leisure, health, education level, biospheric
quality, and so on. Suppose the welfare that the agent enjoys or sustains with this vector
is u(zt ) , where u is a ‘utility function’ common to all agents (i.e., it reflects human
nature). An amenity path is an infinite sequence of these vectors, one for each
generation: thus, (z1 , z2 , z3 ,...) . Such a path may eventually become an unending
sequence of zero vectors, reflecting the fact that the species has disappeared and
consumes nothing.
Current scientific knowledge can be summarized by saying that we believe that
there is a certain set of feasible consumption paths, denoted Z.

Any path in Z can be

implemented, from the technological and physical/biological viewpoint. Of course,
different paths implement different trade-offs regarding the consumptions of the prent
and future generations.

What does ‘feasible’ mean in this sentence? Feasibility takes

account of how much we invest in research and development, and how much technology
improves as a consequence of that investment. All aspects of technological change,
environmental damage, and human knowledge are endogenous, in the sense of being
generated by investments in research, the environment, and education at earlier dates.
To specify the set Z we will normally write down a set of dynamic equations which
relate how all data about the economy at any date t+1 appear as a result of what has
happened (e.g., investment of various kinds) at previous dates.

Heroically, we will

assume, here, that all these dynamic relationships are known. Thus, although we do not
know what the technology will be in 200 years, we assume that we can estimate how
much labor productivity will increase if we follow a given path of investment in
education and in research and development. These estimates are provided by historical
data, which enable us to track how labor productivity has increased in the past as a result
of these investments. A more complex problem would be posed if we wanted to build in
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uncertainty in our knowledge of these relationships, so that the set Z would only be
specified up to what that uncertainty would imply.
Our ethical view is summarized by an intertemporal welfare function, which
aggregates the welfare levels of the various generations into an index of social welfare1.
The arguments of this function, W, are the vectors of generational utilities induced by an
amenity path. Thus, at the path z = (z1 , z2 , z3 ,....) the social welfare will be

W (u(z1 ),u(z2 ),u(z3 ),...) .
It is important to underscore that W embodies our ethical views about how the welfare of
one generation should be traded off against the welfare of other generations, and the set Z
embodies facts about the world – that is, facts of nature (biology, physics) and facts about
human knowledge and learning.

Many discussants in the climate-change debate do not

respect this division of labor – they want the function W to embody facts about the world,
not only ethical views.
The problem of the social planner is to choose that feasible amenity path (in Z)
which maximizes social welfare: that is to choose z = (z1 , z2 ,...) to
maximize W (u(z1 ),u(z2 ),...) subject to z Z .
In terms of the just-stated division of labor, the problem is to attain the highest possible
ethical index subject to the constraints placed upon us by facts about the world.
Let us take an example. Consider the utilitarian social welfare function which is
given by


W U (u1 ,u2 ,...) =  ut ,
t =1

where ut is the utility of generation t. The problem for a utilitarian is to find the amenity
path that maximizes the sum of utilities over all future dates.
If, indeed, W should be justified by purely ethical arguments, then we would
expect that W should be symmetric in its arguments: that is, it should treat all generations
equally. Why, indeed, should any generation have a right to more utility than another –
1

More generally, we may order infinite utility streams in a way that cannot be
represented by a social welfare function. This issue has been much studied in the recent
literature, but we ignore it for our purposes here. See, for example, Basu and Mitra
(2003).
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why should we place a higher social value on one generation’s receiving more utility than
another?

For example, symmetry means that if there were just two generations, then it

should be the case that the planner is indifferent between giving the first generation 7 and
the second one 10 units of utility, and the other way around: that is, for any numbers u
and v it should be true that

W (u, v) = W (v,u) .
Indeed, this is true of the utilitarian social welfare function: it does not matter in what
order we list the utility numbers, their sum will be the same.
I can now state the social welfare function which is employed by almost all the


economists working in the area of climate change: it is W DU (u1 ,u2 ,...) =   t 1ut , where
t =1

 is a number less than one, called the discount factor. The superscript ‘DU’ stands for
‘discounted utilitarian.’ Sometimes the discount factor is written as  =

1
, and  is
1+

called the discount rate.
One immediately notes that this social-welfare function is not symmetric: it places
less value on the utility of generations, the farther distant they are from the present. What
could justify such a move? There are a number of possible justifications for adopting a
discounted-utilitarian intertemporal ethic. I will partition them into three categories,
which I discuss in turn.
A. The present generation as hegemon
I present two justifications in this category.
A.1. The infinitely lived consumer
Suppose we think of the generations of mankind as ethically analogous to
different periods in the life of a single individual. Suppose this individual discounts her
own future utility at a rate  : that is, if the path of her consumption of amenities is given
by z = (z1 , z2 ,...) then her ‘lifetime’ utility will be u(z1 ) + u(z2 ) +  2u(z3 ) + ... . The
number  reflects the individual’s degree of impatience: if  = 0.9 , this individual
would trade-off one unit of utility next year for slightly more than 0.9 units of utility
today.
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If we choose  to reflect an individual’s subjective rate of time preference
(impatience) in this manner, and if we use the discounted-utilitarian social welfare
function, then the different generations of human society are being treated as if they were
different periods in the life of this individual. In particular, if  is ‘small,’ the
individual is ‘impatient,’ and we will discount the welfare of future generations just as a
quite impatient individual discounts his own future welfare.
A.2. The altruistic parent
Suppose that each adult has one child and cares about the utility of her child.
Suppose the utility of the parent, who is an adult at date t, is a function the amenities she
enjoys and of her child’s utility, and this takes a linear form, where she places a weight of

 < 1 on her child’s utility:
U1 (z1 ,U 2 ) = u(z1 ) + U 2 .

(1)

Here, U1 is the overall utility function of the parent, which is a function of what we
might call her personal standard of living, which is a function u of the amenities she
consumes, and of the overall utility of her child.
But the same equation holds for generation 2:

U 2 (z2 ,U 3 ) = u(z2 ) + U 3 .

(2)

Substituting this expression for U 2 into (1), we have:
U1 (z1 ,U 2 ) = u(z1 ) + u(z2 ) +  2U 3 .

(3)

Indeed, we can continue to expand the right-hand side of this equation indefinitely, which
gives the formula:


U1 =   t 1u(zt ) .

(4)

t =1

The right-hand side of equation (4) is just the discounted-utilitarian formula.
In other words: If all parents are altruistic, and conceive of their overall welfare
as their own standard of living plus a number  times their child’s (overall) welfare, then
maximizing the overall welfare of the first generation implies maximizing the sum of
discounted standards of living of all generations.
The reason I place justifications A.1 and A.2 of discounted utilitarianism in the
category ‘present generation as hegemon’ is that they both amount to maximizing the
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utility of the first generation.

For the utility in (4) is just the utility of the generation –

one parent!

B. Uncertain existence of future generations
Suppose that the social evaluator is uncertain when the human species will
become extinct. We make an extremely simple assumption, that there is a probability of
p that each generation in the future will be the last generation; there is an independent
draw at each date, which, with probability p, will extinguish mankind. This probability,
we furthermore assume, is independent of the amenity path that is chosen (a highly
unreasonable but simplifying assumption).
Suppose the evaluator is a utilitarian: if he knew that the world would last exactly
T generations, then he would choose a consumption path z T = (z1 , z2 ,..., zT ) to maximize
T

 u(z ) .
t

We now assume that this evaluator has von Neumann – Morgenstern

t =1

preferences over lotteries – in this case, the lottery is over the number of dates that the
species will exist – and that his von Neumann- Morgenstern utility function is given by
the utilitarian function. Then he should choose the consumption path to maximize his
expected utility: that is, the probability-weighted sum of the utilities he receives if the
world lasts any finite number of dates. Suppose that the probability that the species lasts
exactly T dates is  (T ) . Then the evaluator’s problem is to choose the infinite path

z = (z1 , z2 , z3 ,...) to maximize:

 (1)u(z1 ) +  (2)(u(z1 ) + u(z2 )) +  (3)(u(z1 ) + u(z2 ) + u(z3 )) + ... .

(5)

It can easily be shown that  (T ) = (1  p)T 1 p , and so, it follows from a little algebra,
that maximizing the expression in (5) is equivalent to maximizing:




t 1

u(xt ) where  = 1  p .

t =1

That is, the social evaluator is just a discounted utilitarian, where the discount factor is
one minus the probability of human extinction at each date.
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Note that in this justification, the discount factor  has nothing to do with a
subjective rate of time preference or a degree of altruism of an agent: it is a technological
parameter concerning the universe.

C. Axiomatic characterizations
These justifications are more abstract. They do not begin with utility functions, or
social welfare functions, but with general orderings on infinite sequences of
utilities u = (u1 ,u2 ,u3 ,...) , to be thought of as describing the utilities experienced by
different generations in a history of the world.
A social welfare function, as defined above, generates an order on such
sequences, but there may be orders that cannot be represented by a social welfare
function. Let us define two axioms on the orderings of these utility streams. The first is
continuity. Suppose we have a sequence of infinite utility streams u1 , u 2 , u 3 ,.... which
converge to a particular infinite utility stream u (that is, stream ui gets very close to the
stream u as i gets large). Continuity states that if every ui is weakly socially preferred to
some other infinite utility stream y, then u must also be weakly preferred to y.
Continuity is an axiom that says the social ordering does not make ‘jumps’. The second
axiom is monotonicity. Suppose we have two infinite utility streams u and u , and the
utility of every generation is at least as large in the first stream as in the second stream,
and some generation has larger utility in the first stream. The monotonicity axiom states
that u should be ranked strictly preferable to u .

This axiom is sometimes called

strong Pareto optimality. If no generation is worse off in u than in u , and some
generation is better off, then the Ethical Observer should rank the u world as (strictly)
better than the u world.
Finally, we define a property called social impatience. Suppose we have a utility
stream u = (u1 ,u2 ,u3 ,...,ut ,ut +1 ,....) and then we create another stream by interchanging
for some t, ut and u1 : thus, û = (ut ,u2 ,u3 ,...,ut 1 ,u1 ,ut +1 ,...) , and suppose that ut > u1 .
Social impatience states that the stream û must be (strictly) preferred to u. In other
words, the social evaluator would prefer to have the larger utility experienced earlier in
history.
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Diamond (1965) proved that if a complete social ordering of infinite utility
streams satisfies continuity and monotonicity, then it must satisfy social impatience.
This means that something like discounting of future utilities must occur if continuity and
monotonicity are satisfied. The Diamond theorem, however, does not say that the social
evaluator maximizes a sum of discounted utilities (that would be a special case of the
Diamond conclusion).
Finally, there is a famous theorem of Koopmans (1960) which provides an
axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism. It is beyond my scope here to present this
result: it says that if a number of axioms are satisfied with respect to the ordering of
infinite utility streams, then the social ordering can be represented by the discounted sum
of some increasing function of the utilities, discounted by some positive discount rate.
But the theorem does not provide any way for adjudicating among these choices. It
merely says that the social preference order lies in a certain class of preference orders2.
Let me now evaluate these various justifications of the discounted-utilitarian
approach. I find both the justifications of Approach A unconvincing. The reason is
simple: the social evaluator is taking into consideration only the utility of the first
generation. This is obviously the case in the model of the infinitely lived consumer – for
there is only one individual in this model. In particular, if the infinitely lived consumer
is very impatient, then the social evaluator discounts heavily the welfare of future
generations.

A similar criticism applies to the altruistic-parent model. Suppose that the

parents across the generations are only mildly altruistic, so that the value of  is small.
Again, the Ethical Observer must discount heavily the welfares of future generations.
There is no justification, in my view, of prejudicing the desires of the first generation in
the way that these two models do. The subjective views of the first generation, with
regard either to impatience or altruism, should not determine our intergenerational ethics.
To give the first generation such power completely violates fairness, which requires that
we give all generations equal consideration. Formally, this is summarized by the
requirement that the social-welfare function be symmetric. To put it slightly differently,

2

There is by now a large literature which develops the axiomatic approach to social
preferences on abstract sets of infinite utility streams. For recent contributions see, for
example, Asheim and Tungodden (2004), and Roemer and Suzumura (2007).
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it is fallacious to assume that either the model of an infinitely-lived consumer, or of the
altruistic parent is ethically equivalent to a model of many distinct generations.
Dasgupta (2005, page xx), an economist active in climate-change analysis,
believes otherwise. He writes, with regard to the model of the infinitely lived consumer:
An individual’s lifetime well-being is an aggregate of the flow of well-being she
experiences, while intergenerational well-being is an aggregate of the lifetime
well-beings of all who appear on the scene. It is doubtful that the two aggregates
have the same functional form. On the other hand, I know of no evidence that
suggests we would be way off the mark in assuming they do have the same form.
As a matter of practical ethics, it helps enormously [my italics- JR] to
approximate by not distinguishing the functional form of someone’s well-being
through time from that of intergenerational well-being.
This is an amazing statement. Dasgupta says, first, and correctly in my view, that there is
no reason to believe that the model of the infinitely-lived consumer is a good model for
intergenerational ethics, but then says it ‘helps enormously’ to assume that it is a good
model. We will argue in this paper that there are very good alternatives to discounted
utilitarianism, and hence this superbly pragmatic view is unnecessary.
Let me turn to Approach C: I will discuss the Diamond result, but the same
critique applies to the Koopmans theorem. One problem with requiring certain axioms to
hold on very complicated mathematical objects (here, sets of infinite utility streams), is
that the axioms may impose restrictions that are much more severe than our intuitions
warrant. For instance, the axiom of continuity is very powerful and abstract. One must
be comfortable with the idea of the convergence of a sequence of paths (each of which
contains an infinite number of elements) to a path. Do our intuitions really grasp the
import of requiring this condition on a social preference order? One of the best ways of
evaluating theorems such as Diamond’s is to ask what kinds of social orderings (i.e.,
theories of intergenerational distributive justice) it declares inadmissible.
three social orderings do not satisfy the Diamond axioms:
•

undiscounted utilitarianism

•

maximin

•

leximin.

The following
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Undiscounted utilitarianism -- that is, ranking two infinite utility streams by comparing


 ut with
t =1



 u -- is ruled inadmissible because it does not provide a complete ordering
t

t =1

– and that is the only reason it is disqualified. It is incomplete, because if the sums of the
utilities on two paths are both infinite, then utilitarianism cannot compare these two paths
-- hence incompleteness (on the domain of utility streams posited in Diamond’s theorem).
But on the set of paths where the sum of utilities does converge, utilitarianism is both
monotonic and continuous. So utilitarianism is eliminated only because it is incomplete.
Is it, however, incompleteness such a defect of an ethical theory? Where, indeed, do we
have an ethical theory that provides convincing answers to all ethical questions?
The ‘maximin’ ordering says that a stream u = (u1 ,u2 ,...) is preferable to a
stream u = (u1, u2 ,...) if and only if the smallest utility in the first stream is greater than
the smallest utility in the second stream. This is a very familiar social ethic, from Rawls
(although he did not apply it in the intergenerational context). But maximin violates
monotonicity: the stream (1, 2, 2, 2,....) is ranked socially indifferent to the stream

(1,1,1,....) , because in both cases the minimum utility is one, which contradicts
monotonicity.
Leximin is the social ordering which ranks one stream as better than another if
and only if the lexicographic minimum of the first is greater than the lexicographic
minimum of the second: but this ordering is not continuous (see Roemer [1996]).
If one believes that these three social orderings have some virtue, then one must
call into question the usefulness of the Diamond result.
It is furthermore the case – and this is of utmost importance in the climate-change
discussion – that the Diamond (and Koopmans) axiomatic characterizations give no clue
as to what the size of the discount rate should be. They both provide axiomatic
characterizations of classes of social preference orders, where the class in each case
contains orders represented by social-welfare functions with a many discount rates.
In my view, Approach B is the only convincing argument for adopting a
discounted-utilitarian approach. I do not say it is a fully convincing argument, because it
depends upon the premise that the Ethical Observer is a utilitarian, and that is
contestable, but I find it to be a good argument for discounted utilitarianism, if one’s
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underlying ethical view is utilitarianism.

How do I address the fact that the discounted-

utilitarian objective does not, in the final analysis, give equal weights to the welfare of all
generations? This comes about because of a naturally asymmetry in facts about the
world: to wit, that the probability that the world will last for T+n generations is less than
the probability that it will last for T generations, for any positive n. (As the physicists
say, time flows in only one way.) Thus, although the Ethical Observer begins with a
symmetric social welfare function, he ends up with an asymmetric one.

3. What climate-change economists do
Most economists (e.g., Nordhaus(2008) and many who use cost-benefit analysis,
although not Stern(2007)) who use a discounted-utilitarian formula in climate-change
analysis adopt the infinitely-lived consumer approach: this can be seen by noting that
they justify their choice of discount factor by appealing to the rate of interest3. I claim
this can only be based on the model of society as one of an infinitely lived consumer.
I will present a model to explain this important point. Suppose that an infinitely
lived individual has a utility function for his consumption over the infinite number of
periods of his life, which is given by:


 1
U(c1 , c2 , c3 ,...) =  

t =1 1 + 

t 1

c1 
u(ct ) , where u(c) =
.
1

Here the function u evaluates the consumer’s single-period utility: it is a concave
function of c for parameter values  > 0 , and it is the utility function that is used by
many climate-change researchers (e.g., Nordhaus). His discount rate, which reflects his
degree of impatience, is ; his discount factor is

1
. Diminishing marginal utility of
1+

consumption is reflected in the assumption that  > 0 .

The individual begins life with

a capital stock of s0 . At each period, he devotes his entire energies to work; the amount
of output he produces at date t if his capital stock inherited from the last date is st 1 is
given by f (st 1 ) , where f is an increasing, concave function. Then his problem of life3

This locution may seem strange. Aren’t economists up-front about their justification of
discounted utilitarianism? No: they rarely state the fundamental view (e.g., the view A
or B or C) that would justify the ethic of discounted utilitarianism.
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time utility maximization is to choose a consumption path (c1 , c2 , c3 ,...) and an investment
path (i1 ,i2 ,i3 ,...) to
maximize

 1 


t =1 1 + 

t 1

ct 1
1

subject to:

(1) ct + it = f (st 1 ), t = 1, 2, 3,...
(2) st = (1  d)st 1 + it , t = 1, 2, 3,...

Program ILC

where it is the amount of output he chooses to invest in the capital stock at date t.
Constraints (1) simply say that output is partitioned between consumption and investment
at each date, and constraints (2) say that the capital stock at date t equals the depreciated
capital stock from the last date plus new investment. (Capital depreciates at rate d per
period.)
Define the growth rate of consumption at date t along a path, denoted g(t) , by the
formula:

1 + g(t) =

ct
.
ct 1

Define the marginal productivity of capital net of the depreciation rate at date t, denoted

r(t) , by:
r(t) = f (st 1 )  d ,
where f  is the derivative of f.

Then it can be proved that the solution of Program ILC

entails that:
(1 +  )(1 + g(t)) = r(t) + 1

for all dates t.

Taking the logarithm of this equation, we have:

log(1 +  ) +  log(1 + g(t)) = log(1 + r(t)) .
Now suppose that the numbers  , g(t), and r(t) are all close to zero. Using the fact that
if x is a small positive number, then log(1 + x)  x , we can write this equation as:

 + g(t)  r(t) ;
finally, we can write this as:

r(t)   + g(t) .

(Ramsey)
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This equation is known as the Ramsey equation, as it was first derived in Ramsey (1928).
The reason the notation r is chosen for the quantity it represents is that in a market
economy where firms maximize profits, r(t) can be thought of, in economic equilibrium,
as the (real) consumption rate of interest.
Now what many economists do, in analyzing climate change, is to deduce the
value of the subjective impatience parameter  from the Ramsey equation. Assuming
that we are in a situation where rates of interest and growth rates of consumption are
relatively stable, we can delete the time arguments in (Ramsey), and write the Ramsey
equation as:

  r  g .

(Ramsey*)

The consumption interest rate r, the growth rate g are all observables from economic
data. Economists in the climate-change area (e.g., Nordhaus and Weitzman) typically
estimate  by appealing to the idea that it reflects attitudes towards risk, and subjective
views of inequality aversion that people have. (A larger value of  reflects a higher
degree of inequality aversion. See Dasgupta (2008) for a good discussion.) Hence  is
estimated, since all the terms on the right-hand side of (Ramsey*) are observed or
conjectured (as with ).

It is this value of  that these economists use as the discount

rate in the social welfare function for intergenerational welfare calculations.
In summary, the discount rate that is estimated from equation (Ramsey*) is based
upon these assumptions :
(1) that the economy is a competitive market economy, and the marginal
productivity of capital net of the rate of depreciation can be taken to be equal to the
observed real consumption interest rate;
(2) an infinitely lived consumer, who represents Society, has decided on his
consumption path by maximizing a utility function in which  is his subjective rate of
time preference.
Nordhaus’s (2008) approach is somewhat of a mixture: he takes the parameter 
in the utility function u to reflect not the individual’s attitude towards his own
consumption, but the (subjective) attitudes of people about inequality of consumption
across generations. But because Nordhaus (and other authors) take r from market data,
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we can only assume that the  they compute from (Ramsey*) is the individual’s rate of
time preference, because in making their savings decisions, actually market agents are
optimizing given their own subjective rates of time preference.
Moreover, I claim that the model of the infinitely-lived consumer is the only way
to justify this choice of the discount factor. This is, of course, a sweeping claim. Surely,
it would be a remarkable coincidence if some other (ethically more appealing) way of
justifying this approach turned out to be equivalent to the model of the infinitely lived
consumer. I cannot prove that this claim is true (who could ever do so?). Suffice to say
that the claims that some have made for other justifications of the Ramsey equation are
bogus (more on this below).
To show the ubiquity of this practice, let me quote Nordhaus (2008, p. 10):
In general, we can think of the discount rate as the rate of return on capital
investments. We can describe this concept by changing our onecommodity economy from corn to trees. Trees tomorrow (or, more
generally, consumption tomorrow) have a different ‘price’ than trees or
consumption today because through production we can transform trees
today into trees tomorrow. For example, if trees grow costlessly at a rate of
5 percent a year, then from a valuation point of view, 105 trees a year from
now is the economic equivalent of 100 trees today. … Therefore, to
compare different policies, we take the consumption flows for each policy
and apply the appropriate discount rate. We then sum the discounted
values for each period to get the total present value. ….The choice of an
appropriate discount rate is particularly important for climate-change
policies because most of the impacts are far in the future. The approach of
the DICE model [Nordhaus’s model] is to use the estimated market return
on capital [ the interest rate] as the discount rate. The estimated discount
rate in the model averages 4 percent per year over the next century.
In fact, in Nordhaus (2008, p. 178) chooses:

r = .055, g = .02  = 2  = .015 .
If we substitute these values into the Ramsey equation, we compute that

r = g +  .
His value of  =

1
is 0.985 , and so the utility of individuals one century from
1+

now is discounted by a factor of (.985)100 = 0.22; their welfare counts about onefifth as much as ours in his social calculus.
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How does this jibe with his claim quoted above that ‘the estimated
discount rate in the model averages 4 percent per year’? This is because there are
in fact two discount factors in Nordhaus’s locution: the discount factor on utility,
which is 1 / (1 +  ) , and the implied discount factor on consumption, which is a
consequence of solving the optimization problem (ILC). At the solution to that
problem, one can ask, “How much would the consumer require as an increment in
consumption at date t (call this increment ct ) in order to compensate him for a
small decrease in consumption (call this decrement ct +1 ) at date t+1? It can be
shown, for the given utility function, that this amount is approximately

1
ct +1 .
1 + rt

(See Dasgupta (2008, fn.12) for the derivation.) So rt can be viewed as the
consumption discount factor, as opposed to  , which is the utility discount factor.
Note, however, that  is a primitive of the model – it comes with the objective
function – while rt is endogenous, a number which is deduced as a consequence of
solving the consumer’s optimization problem. For conceptual clarity, it is the
discount rate on utility that is important for the theory.
Let me respond in another way to the above citation of Nordhaus, for his
argument may sound appealing to the reader: Why, indeed, should we not discount
future welfare by a great deal, if the marginal productivity of capital is so large, so
that 100 trees today can be transformed into 100 x (1.04)100 = 5050 trees a century
from now? The answer is that this fact of capital’s marginal productivity will be
properly incorporated into the specification of the set Z of amenity paths – and that
is the only way it should appear in the problem. Our social welfare function must
be founded on ethical judgments only, not on technological facts.

Our problem is

to maximize a welfare function justified by general ethical principles, which
properly incorporates the relative worth of all generations, subject to constraints
which are determined by facts about the world (technological progress, the
influence of emissions on biospheric quality, etc.).
The same conceptual error occurs, in a slightly different form, in the next
citation. Partha Dasgupta, a more philosophically oriented economist than
Nordhaus, writes as follows (Dasgupta [2008, p. 145]):
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There are two reasons why it may be reasonable [to discount future
consumption at a positive rate]. First, an additional unit of consumption
tomorrow would be of less value than an additional unit of consumption
today if society is impatient to enjoy that additional unit now (my italics –
JR). Therefore, impatience is a reason for discounting future costs and
benefits at a positive rate. Second, considerations of justice and equality
demand that consumption should be evenly spread across the generations.
So, if future generations are likely to be richer than us, there is a case for
valuing an extra unit of their consumption less than an extra unit of our
consumption, other things being equal. Rising consumption provides a
second justification for discounting future consumption costs and benefits
at a positive rate.
Dasgupta’s first reason for positive discounting of the consumption of future
generations, which I have italicized, is clearly based on the model of the infinitelylived consumer. Who is ‘society’ in his phrase? It is the present generation.
Surely, if ‘society’ included all future generations, his phrase would be
nonsensical. (How could we say that our great-grandchildren are impatient to
enjoy an extra unit of consumption now? ) But society, for the Ethical Observer
must comprise all generations of humans who will ever live. Dasgupta’s second
reason for discounting future utility is incoherent, for it puts the cart before the
horse. We do not know that future societies will be ‘richer’ than we are: whether
or not that occurs will be an outcome of the policies we decide to implement – it
cannot be taken as a premise. And if those societies are indeed ‘richer,’ because of
the technological progress that takes place -- which will depend, inter alia, on the
resources we pass down to the next generation through education -- and because
we have saved the global commons for them, and it turns out that the optimal
policy has their consuming more than we do, their average unit of consumption
will not receive as much weight in the social-welfare function as our average unit
as long as  > 0 , which implements diminishing marginal utility. Why further
discount their utility with positive discount rates? This is, again, an issue of
mixing the ethics (which determine what social welfare function we maximize)
with the facts about the world (which determine the feasible set of paths over
which maximization takes place).
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Weitzman (2007) also bases his analysis on the Ramsey equation, and
proposes the values:

r = 0.06 g = 0.02  = 2  = 0.02 .
Thus Weitzman would discount the utility of individuals one century from now by
 1 
a factor of 
 1 +  

100

= .138 ; their utility is worth about one-seventh of ours, in

his social calculus.
The only economist recently active in climate-change research who is a
discounted utilitarian and uses a discount factor very close to one is Stern (2007),
who chooses  = 0.001 per annum. This gives a discount factor of  = 0.999 per
year. Stern would therefore discount the utility of those living a century from now
 1 
by the factor 
 1.001 

100

= 0.90 , that is, by only about 10%. And Stern (2008)

writes explicitly that the only justification for discounting utilities of future
generations is because of the possibility that they might not exist. So Stern is
clearly adopting Approach B described here, and assuming that the probability that
the species becomes extinct is 0.001 in each year.
Indeed, Stern (2007) has been criticized by Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman
(2007) for using a discount factor too close to one. Although the arguments of these
critics are stated in terms of opportunity costs, and are not transparent to the noneconomist, they all boil down to a fundamental claim that the right discount factor is
derived from the observed marginal productivity of capital. Since the marginal
productivity of capital in a competitive economy is equal to the interest rate, which is the
‘opportunity cost’ of using resources today instead of tomorrow, the arguments are stated
in terms of opportunity cost. The critics would be more forthright if they simply argued
that the right model for intergenerational welfare analysis is the one of the infinitely-lived
consumer, rather our Approach B.
Lest readers think that I put too fine a point on the issue of the meaning of the
discount rate, and therefore on its size, I quote the abstract from Nordhaus (2007):
How much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming? The
Stern Review argues that the damages from climate change are large, and that
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nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions. An examination of the Review's radical revision of the economics of
climate change finds, however, that it depends decisively on the assumption of a
near-zero time discount rate [ i.e.,  = .001 ] combined with a specific utility
function. The Review's unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme
immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are
consistent with today's marketplace real interest rates and savings rates.
Although Frank Ramsey (1928) pioneered the analysis of intertemporal social
welfare, he wrote in the introduction of that paper:
One point should perhaps be emphasized more particularly; it is assumed that we
do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which
is ethically indefensible and arises merely from weakness of the imagination; we
shall, however, in Section II, include a rate of discount in some of our
investigations.
Ramsey is perfectly clear, and correct, on the ethics. So why did he nevertheless
introduce a rate of discount later in his paper? Because often it is the case that the
maximum of the undiscounted utilitarian welfare function is infinite, and this infinite
value is achieved by many possible consumption paths, so the utilitarian view provides
no way of choosing an optimal path!

This, indeed, is why many economists today use

discounted-utilitarianism: not because it has a sound ethical foundation – at least for the
discount rates commonly employed – but because it gives a unique answer to the
problem.

There is no good justification for this practice: it is an example of looking for

the lost diamond ring under the street lamp, because that is the only place one can see! If
(undiscounted) utilitarianism does not enable us to find the optimal policy in all
problems, that means only that it is an incomplete ethical doctrine – not something to be
ashamed of. Recall how Diamond’s axiomatization eliminated utilitarianism ab initio
because it is an incomplete ordering.

This does not imply that the way of ‘completing’

utilitarianism is to discount future utilities with sufficiently small discount factors so that
unique optimal paths exist.

An argument with valid ethical foundations must be given

to justify such a practice.
Bad ethics – adopting the model of the infinitely – lived consumer as ethically
equivalent to a sequence of generations of human beings—are prevalent among
economists on this important issue, and this is reflected in the focus of discussion being
‘what is the proper discount rate to choose,’ as if this were a subjective issue. According
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to Approach B, there is fact of the matter as to what the discount rate should be, and it
has nothing to do with (subjective) rates of time preference of individuals, or subjective
degrees of intergenerational altruism.
It must be said that Weitzman (2008), although he adopts the view of the
infinitely-lived consumer, has another argument for the irrelevance of the discount rate –
that is, that consequences of not taking serious measures to control emissions today will
be so disastrous (with large probability), that the precise value of the discount rate is of
only secondary importance. In terms of the mathematics, he is saying that with
insufficient abatement, the utilities of generations not far in the future may be so low that
even a discounted utilitarian who chooses  to be fairly small would decide upon serious
abatement.

I agree with Weitzman’s conclusion, but it does not substitute for doing the

ethics properly.
I do not wish to misrepresent Dasgupta’s position. I have quoted him as
advocating the model of the infinitely-lived consumer, and deducing the discount factor
from market data. But his position is ambivalent. In Dasgupta (2008, p.157), he also
writes:
One influential school of philosophers has argued that societal impatience is
ethically indefensible. They say that to set  > 0 is to favour policies that
discriminate against the well-being of future generations merely on the grounds
that they are not present today. They also say that values frequently in use among
economists, ranging as they do between 2-3% a year, are way too high. I find
their arguments hard to rebut.
Dasgupta does not seem satisfied with any of the resolutions on offer of the problem of
choosing the ‘right’ values for  and  . I submit that the true problem may be in the
adherence to the (discounted) utilitarian social welfare function. Dasgupta (and surely
Nordhaus and Weitzman as well) do not consider abandoning utilitarianism as the basis
for intergenerational ethics.
doing so.

4. Sustainability

I will argue in the next section that one should consider
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I have argued that, if the Ethical Observer is a utilitarian with von NeumannMorgenstern preferences under uncertainty, then he should choose a discount rate very
close to zero, to reflect the very small probability that the human species will end at any
given date. (Of course, this argument is modulo the simplifying assumption that the
consumption path chosen will not affect that probability. ) But are there alternatives to
being a utilitarian? It is noteworthy, as I have pointed out, that neither side of the
‘discount rate debate’ that has taken place in the last two years in the economics journals
challenges utilitarianism as an ethical view.
Although Rawls mounted a pervasive critique of utilitarianism, this seems to have
had little effect on economists, who routinely adopt utilitarian objective functions. This
is not the place to review the arguments pro and con. Let us just note the simple fact that
utilitarianism treats society as a vessel without boundaries between persons – in the
precise sense that all that matters is the total stuff (utility) in the vessel, not how it is
distributed among the individuals who comprise it. In this sense, it seems quite at odds
with liberalism, which prizes individual distinctiveness. Utilitarians attempt to temper
the indifference of utilitarianism to distribution by choosing values of  in the utility
function u(c) =

c1 
which are greater than one, which builds in an aversion to
1

inequality between individuals (here, between generations). I believe this is an ad hoc
way of addressing the problem.
Indeed, there is an obvious alternative to utilitarianism, which draws upon the
popular view that we should intergenerational ethics should require sustainability. How
can we interpret this view? I propose that it means that the Ethical Observer should
choose a consumption path which maximizes the level of human welfare that can be
sustained forever (or for as long as the human species exists). Suppose the human
species were to last forever: then the problem would be to choose z Z to maximize the
number  such that, for every date t, u(zt )   .

That is – human welfare is sustained

at a level of at least  for all time, where the path is chosen so that  is the largest
number making this statement true.
I note that this is distinctly anthropomorphic conception of sustainability: it
differs from strong sustainability, which maintains that the biological capital of the earth
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should be sustained forever. The anthropomorphic conception is less radical and is often
called ‘weak sustainability’: it is theoretically possible that humans could deplete the
earth’s biological capital and maintain their own welfare.
In other parlance, this is just the ‘maximin’ social welfare function: that is,  is
just the welfare of the worst-off generation.

My collaborators and I find this an

attractive ethic, and we have investigated its consequences for intertemporal distribution
in Llavador, Roemer, and Silvestre (2008a), hereafter LRSa. Sustainability was first
introduced into the economic literature soon after John Rawls’s book was published:
early contributions were Arrow (1973), Dasgupta (1974), and Solow (1974). For more
recent contributions to the topic, see the footnote 5 below.
The simplest ethical justification of sustainability, so defined, is that the date at
which a person is born should be viewed as arbitrary from the moral viewpoint, and
therefore no generation should be better off than any other generation, unless such a
utility difference comes for free, in the sense that it comes without lowering the utility of
the worst off generation. This does not necessarily mean that utilities will be equal for
all generations –- that is, the ‘maximin’ path may Pareto dominate the highest equalutility path. We are familiar with such a possibility from Rawls; however, the reason
this may occur here is not due to the familiar incentive effects in Rawls. It is, rather, that
there may exist intergenerational public goods which would be produced by early
generations for their own welfare, but which impact positively upon the welfare of future
generations. (For instance, our generation invents the steam engine for ourselves, and
future generations reap the benefits as well – for free.) So maximin may well dominate
equality in the intergenerational context, when innovation is taken into account4. For an
extended discussion of this point, see Silvestre (2002), which characterizes exactly when
the maximin solution engenders an increase in welfares over generations.
The social welfare function which models sustainability is

W S (u(z1 ),u(z2 ),u(z3 ),...) = min u(zt ) .
t

4

(6)

Suppose we applied the reasoning of Dasgupta(2007). Suppose that the solution of the
intergenerational maximin program produces increasing utilities as time progresses.
Should we then go back and alter our maximin objective to penalize later generations
because they did well in the first formulation? Hardly.
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Solving the problem
maxW S (u(z1 ),...) subject to z Z

(7)

is the same as finding the maximum  and z such that u(zt )   for all t.
In LRSa5, we present a model calibrated to our world with climate change (this
amounts to being very precise about the nature of the set Z, deriving it from physical
constraints concerning production, education, the impact of emissions on biospheric
quality, etc.) and we solve problem (7) – that is, we find the path that would sustain
welfare at the highest possible level, given current knowledge about the relationship
between production, emissions, and global warming.

It turns out that the utilities of all

generations are equal along that path– that is, maximin and equality indeed recommend
the same path in this case.
Some may be disturbed by this outcome, and thereby reject sustainability as an
ethic, because it appears to relegate us to a world with no growth (of human welfare)6.
Would it not be desirable to have some growth in human welfare – and if so, to use a
different social-welfare function? Let us recognize what the trade-offs are. If we wish
to have positive growth in human welfare, that means that the early generations will have
lower welfare than have in the sustainable solution – growth is purchased at this cost.
But why should early generations sacrifice for later ones? There is no obvious answer.
There is a second defense of the sustainability model.

In the intertemporal

problem, we have ignored intratemporal inequality. A strong argument for growth is
that it usually improves the standard of living of the very poor, which has high ethical
value. If there is no intratemporal inequality, this justification disappears. Thus,
properly (and consistently) to consider the plight of the very poor requires another model,

5

Geir Asheim, and scholars with whom he has collaborated, has written extensively on
sustainability in abstract models: see, for example, Withagen and Asheim (1998),
Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden (2001), and Buchholz (1998). I believe, however, that
LRSa is the first attempt to compute sustainable optimal paths in a concrete model,
parameterized with real data.
6
Indeed, the path that solves the optimization problem (7) is the best feasible path
according to both the maximin and the leximin criterion. Thus, one can choose which
ethic one prefers to justify it. (Following the discussion of Approach C, one can thereby
choose either to justify it by an ethic that violates continuity, or one that violates
monotonicity.)
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where there is heterogeneity of individuals at each generation – the simplest model would
have one poor individual and one rich individual at each date. In that model, we could
advocate a preference for paths that bring the welfare of the present-day poor up to the
welfare of the present-day rich, over a period of time, and then sustain that welfare level
forever.

For further discussion, see section 8.

Nevertheless, Llavador, Silvestre, and I believe that the issue of sustainability
versus growth (of human welfare) cannot be settled completely at the abstract level: it
requires discovering what the actual trade-offs are – that is, how much the early
generation(s) would have to sacrifice to permit positive rates of growth of human welfare.
We investigate in LRSa, besides the sustainable solution, a model which allows for
human development: that is, growth of welfare over time.

In this case, the problem

becomes:
choose z Z to maximize  subject to u(zt )  (1 + g)t 1 .

(8)

Here, we specify exogenously a rate of growth g, and require human welfare to grow at a
rate of at least g at every date.

If g = 0, (8) reduces to the sustainability problem. A

possible justification for choosing g greater than zero is that humans want their children
to be better off than they are; indeed, they are willing to sacrifice their own welfare to
make this possible – or , to state this less personally (so that childless adults are included)
each generation wants human development to take place, in the sense of increasing
generational welfare. Program (8) will have a solution for an interval of positive values
of g.
It is important to note that in program (8), we specify exogenously the rate of
growth g. Solving (8) is not equivalent to solving the discounted-utilitarian problem. We
do not have an ethical theory directing us how to choose g. We will present some of our
results of these two formulations of the intergenerational social-welfare problem below in
section 6. We will argue that small positive values of g deliver solutions that may appear
to be ethically preferable to the solution with g = 0 (pure sustainability), because the cost
borne by the first generation to sustain a small positive g seems acceptable.

5. The consumptionist fallacy
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In the global-warming literature, economists usually specify the vector of
amenities as comprising only one component: consumption of a single commodity. For
example, Nordhaus (2007) chooses u(c) =

c1 
where  is a positive number, and c is
1

the consumption of the representative individual of a produced commodity. Thus, human
welfare depends only upon commodity consumption, the commodity being produced
from capital and labor, and welfare exhibits diminishing marginal utility in consumption.
There is an argument of mathematical simplicity that favors choosing only one
amenity, but LRSa argues that it constitutes a ‘consumptionist fallacy’ to conceptualize
human welfare as depending only upon consumption of produced goods. LRSa postulate
a vector of amenities that comprises four elements: consumption, educated leisure, the
stock of human knowledge, and the quality of the biosphere.

Thus, there are four

avenues that can be traveled to increase welfare: increasing consumption, increasing
education, and so on.

As well as being, we feel, more psychologically realistic, this

allows for the possibility that we maintain (or increase) human welfare by shifting from
emissions-producing commodities to other activities (like production of knowledge and
education) which are less emission intensive, but also affect welfare positively.
Nordhaus (2008) states that taking utility to depend only on one consumption
good is a permissible abstraction, and that his reader may think of consumption as
comprised of various goods. But this is not right. The essential point is that consuming
the four goods in the Quality of Life function of LRSa involve quite different impacts on
the biosphere. We may be able to sustain human welfare by, for example, substituting
education (a low-emissions activity) for automobiles (a high emissions activity). The
consumptionist fallacy is committed when the model does not represent consumption
alternatives for people as implying different effects on scarce biospheric resources.
Consumption and leisure are private goods, while the stock of human knowledge
and biospheric quality are public goods. We defend modifying leisure by the individual’s
level of education by saying that education enables more uses for one’s leisure time –
hence it increases welfare. It is perhaps contestable to include the stock of human
knowledge as a factor in individual welfare: we argue that our lives are better, to the
extent that our science and art and more developed – not because science improves the
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quality of commodities we consume (that will be reflected in consumption) -- but for
perfectionist reasons. Knowing how the world works is an intrinsic good in human
experience – how else to explain our quest for abstract knowledge, which has no
immediate application? Finally, including biospheric quality in the welfare of individuals
models the value that species variety and other biological and environmental goods have
for humans, intrinsically, quite apart from the medicines that they may generate (although
health is also related to biospheric quality).
On this last point, the philosophical reader may be puzzled: if economists who
study global warming place only commodity consumption in the basket of amenities, and
not biospheric quality, how do they model the bad effects of GHG emissions? The
answer is that these emissions are assumed to increase the costs (capital and labor) of
producing commodities – so they impact negatively on consumption. The only way in
which a thing can be bad, if the only amenity is commodity consumption, is if it reduces
the possibilities of consuming!
In sum, the larger the number of amenities postulated, the more strategies there
are for maintaining human welfare besides maintaining commodity consumption. The
consumptionist fallacy would seem to force too dismal a set of choices for human society
– not to speak the truncated conception of human well-being that it models.

6. Sustainability: Some results
Here, I summarize some of the results of analyzing the sustainability model of
LRSa. What we call the Quality of Life (QuoL) of a given generation (that is, its
‘utility’) is a function of commodity consumption, leisure time multiplied by the level of
the individual’s education, the stock of knowledge, and the quality of the biosphere
(taken to be inversely related to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere).

The labor of the

single individual at each generation is divided into four uses: educating the next
generation, participation in commodity production, working in the ‘knowledge industry’
(research and development, the arts, university research), and enjoying leisure time.
The model begins at year 2000, with four initial stocks: the average level of education of
the consumer-producer, the stock of physical capital, the stock of knowledge, and the
quality of the biosphere. There are four production functions: the production of
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educated children from adult teaching, the production of commodities from educated
labor and capital, the production of knowledge from educated labor and capital, and the
production of biosphere quality from the current stock of biospheric quality and
emissions. Emissions are the consequence of commodity production, but the
relationship between output and emissions changes as a consequence of technological
progress, whose rate is a function of the stock of knowledge.

The commodity produced

is used for human consumption and investment (increasing the capital stock). In turn,
capital depreciates, as does knowledge (the knowledge of how to make mechanical
watches is of little value today). The stocks and flows are illustrated in Figure 1.
There are many parameters in the model: parameters which specify the four
production functions, those which specify the relationship between production and
emissions, those which model the rate of technical change, those which describe the way
the amenities combine into an index of quality-of-life, and the two rates of depreciation.
These parameters are estimated from data using familiar econometric techniques.
Unfortunately, we had to use, for the most part, US data, and so we cannot argue that our
results are realistic for the world.

When all parameters have been chosen, and when the

initial vector of four stocks is specified, we can define the set Z of feasible paths of
amenity vectors over time as paths of variables that solve a set of dynamic equations.
The greatest uncertainty is associated with the production function of biospheric
quality, for this entails understanding two relationships – that of commodity production
and consequent emissions to the concentration of atmospheric carbon, and the
relationship of that stock to global temperature. As I said, the science on these
questions is in flux. LRSa simplifies the problem by taking, as the measure of biospheric
quality, the amount of ‘clean biosphere,’ the difference between a catastrophically high
level of carbon particulate concentration and the present level. This resource of clean
biosphere is then related to global temperature, which is related to human welfare, using
current best estimates.

We then compute the optimal sustainable paths that can be

achieved under various constraints on emissions – that they be such as to (approximately)
stabilize concentrations at 360 ppm in two generations, or in another variant, at 400 ppm
in two generations, and so on.
constant.

It is assumed in these calculations that population size is
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In Table 1, taken from LRSa, the scenario is that carbon concentration stabilizes
at 363 ppm in two generations (fifty years). We constrained our production paths to
produce emissions which are consonant with approximate stabilization at this level of
concentration according to the estimates of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s Fourth Assessment Report, (IPCC[2008, Chapter 10]).

An approximation to

the optimal sustainable path is given in the table. Consumption stabilizes in four
generations at 31.759, approximately 33% above year 2000 levels7. This is 100 years
from now, and therefore entails a growth of consumption of 0.29% per annum during this
century – a very low growth rate. In 100 years, the capital stock stabilizes at 201% of its
year-2000 level, which represents an annual rate of growth of 0.7%. The stock of
knowledge stabilizes at 278% of its year-2000 level, which represents an annual growth
rate of 1.02 %. The level of education of the generation 100 years hence would be 130%
of the year-2000 level, which represents an annual growth rate of 0.26%. It is interesting
to note that consumption and education increase at approximately the same small rate for
one century, and then remain constant thereafter. The capital stock and knowledge
increase much more rapidly to their stable levels.

We note as well that leisure time

does not increase – in fact, it decreases a small amount. In 2000, two-thirds (0.6667) of
time was spent in leisure, while in 100 years, it be fall to 0.6588 in the approximately
optimal scenario. Indeed, a significantly smaller fraction of labor would be teaching the
next generation, and a significantly larger fraction would be working in the knowledge
industry (research and the arts). Note that the educational level of children would be
higher, because it is a function of the skill-hours employed in teaching, not just ‘hours,’
and the educational level of teachers increases.
[place table 1 here]
We next present results for a scenario which has the same emission constraints as
the previous one, but implements a 1% per annum (28% per generation) increase in the
Quality of Life forever. (This corresponds to choosing g = 0.28 in equation (8).) Of
course, some generation(s) must sacrifice to permit this growth, and we will see it is

7

In the truly optimal solution, the Quality of Life would be constant across generations.
We are unable to compute this solution precisely; the approximation presented in Table 1
converges to constant levels of Life Quality after several generations.
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(only) the first generation. The results are presented in Table 2. Indeed, this growth
rate is feasible, while achieving carbon stabilization at 363 ppm in two generations. The
trade-off is seen by looking at the quality-of-life of generation 1.

In Table 1, this

welfare level was 1.3110, and in table 2 it is 1.2999 – a bit less than 1% lower. This
sacrifice by Generation 1, however, entails what appears to be significant growth in lifequality for all generations after that: indeed, in a century, life-quality is 274% higher than
in year 2000. Educational levels are 279% higher than year 2000 levels. The sacrifice
of the first generation might well be appealing, in the light of future welfare gains that it
triggers. From an ethical viewpoint, it is therefore not obvious that sustainability
dominates a path that allows for some human development.
[place table 2 here]
The reader is referred to LRSa for more scenarios.

We did not compute the

optimal discounted-utilitarian paths for the model in LRSa. Nordhaus (2008) computes
those paths, but his sets of feasible paths are so different in their details from ours that a
comparison of the results would not be terribly meaningful. We presume that if we
maximized a discounted-utilitarian objective with Nordhaus’s value of  = 0.985 per
generation, the recommended paths would be quite different.

7. Uncertainty
Now suppose we impose uncertainty of the kind discussed in Approach B of
section 2 on this problem: there is an exogenously given probability p that, at each date,
the human species will become extinct. The Ethical Observer is now a sustainabilitarian,
with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function derived from W S . That is, the von
Neumann Morgenstern utility that the Ethical Observer enjoys if she has chosen the
infinite amenity path z and the world, in the event, lasts for exactly T dates, is

min[u(z1 ),u(z2 ),....,u(zT )] .
Then she should choose the consumption path z that maximizes her expected utility,
which is now:

 (1)u(z1 ) +  (2)min[u(z1 ),u(z2 )] +  (3)min[u(z1 ),u(z2 ),u(z3 )] + ...
This is a well-defined mathematical problem, which (it is easy to show) we can write as:
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t 1

min[u(x1 ),...,u(xt )] where  = 1  p .

(9)

t =1

Thus, the ‘discounted sustainabilitarian’ uses the same discount rate as the discounted
utilitarian of Approach B, but with a different von Neumann-Moregenstern utilitiy
function. At every date, she is concerned with the minimum utility of all those who have
thus far lived, rather than with the sum of those utilities.
There is no explicit treatment of uncertainty in either Nordhaus (2008) or LRSa.
In this section, we present some results comparing discounted utilitarianism (DU) to
sustainabilitarianism (Sus) in the presence of the kind of certainty discussed in section 2,
what we called the uncertain existence of future generations.
Ideally, we would like to analyze the optimal discounted-utilitarian and
sustainabilitarian paths for the model of LRSa, described in section 4. That model,
however, is complex, and characterizing the optimal paths for general vectors of
parameters is very difficult. In Llavador, Roemer, and Silvestre (2008b), hereafter
LRSb, we study these solutions for a much simpler model, which, we hope, will suggest
what we can expect for a more complex and realistic model.
The model of LRSb has only two sectors: commodity production and education.
The initial social endowment has two elements: the stock of capital, and the stock of
educated labor at the beginning date. Capital and labor produce a commodity, which is
used for investment and consumption. Labor is partitioned into teaching, commodity
production, and leisure. Utility, or the Quality of Life, is a function of consumption and
educated leisure.

There is no issue of biospheric quality, and no knowledge sector.

Define:

ct as consumption of generation t
xte as the amount of educated labor allocated to teaching at generation t
xtc as the amount of educated labor in commodity production at generation t
xtl as the amount of skill-indexed leisure time at generation t
xt = xte + xtc + xtl as the total value of skilled labor at generation t

it as investment at generation t
stk as the capital stock at date t
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d rate of depreciation of capital per generation.

The production function which describes the amount of the produced commodity
forthcoming from a vector of capital and skilled labor is f (s k , x c ) . A feasible path for
the economy consists of a sequence of choices concerning the labor allocation among
teaching the next generation, production of the commodity, and leisure, and the allocation
of the produced commodity between consumption and investment, which can be
achieved, beginning with the initial social endowment of capital and labor in the
It is a path of choices {(stk ,it , xtc , xte , xtl , ct ) | t = 1, 2, 3,...}

education sector, (s0k , x0e ) .

satisfying the following equations:

stk = (1  d)stk1 + it for t = 1, 2,...

(P1)

ct + it = f (s , x )

(P2)

k
t

e
t 1

kx

for t = 1, 2,...

c
t

= xt  x + x + x
c
t

e
t

l
t

for t = 1, 2,...

(P3)

Equations (P1) state that the capital stock at date t equals the depreciated capital
stock from date t  1 plus new investment; equations (P2) state that the commodity,
produced from capital and labor, is partitioned at every date between consumption and
investment; equations (P3) state that the amount of skill units of labor at date t is
proportional to the skill units of labor allocated to teaching at date t  1.

The set of all

feasible paths emanating from the endowment (s0k , x0e ) will be called Ẑ(s0k , x0e ) .

A path

of feasible amenity vectors is a path of consumption – leisure pairs, that is of vectors
(ct , xtl ) , that is part of some feasible path. We write such a path as
z = ((c1 , x1l ),(c2 , x2l ),...) .

What humans care about is consumption and educated leisure,

and the other variables in a feasible path are subordinate to producing an amenity path.
The Quality of Life (or utility) function for every generation is u(c, x l ) , which we take to
be a Cobb-Douglas function of these two arguments.
We now state three problems of interest. The first is the problem of the
sustainabilitarian ethical observer, in an environment with no uncertainty about the
existence of future generations.

This problem is to find the feasible path that maximizes

the Quality of Life that can be sustained forever, from an initial endowment vector
(s0k , x0e ) .

It is written:
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max  subject to
u(ct , xtl )  

(P0)

stk = (1  d)stk1 + it , t  1

(P1)

ct + it = f (stk , xtc )

, t 1

(P2)

= xt  x + x + x , t  1

e
t 1

c
t

kx

e
t

(program SUS)

l
t

(P3)

The next two programs are relevant in a world where the existence of future generations
is uncertain.

The first is the program of the utilitarian ethical observer who faces

uncertainty:


max   t 1u(xt ) subject to
t =1

s = (1  d)stk1 + it , t  1
k
t

ct + it = f (s , x )
k
t

(P1)

, t 1

c
t

(P2)

= xt  x + x + x , t  1
where  = 1  p.
e
t 1

kx

c
t

e
t

l
t

(program DU)

(P3)

This is the discounted utilitarian program. The next program is the one of the
sustainabilitarian who faces uncertainty, which is:


max   t 1 min[u(x1 ),...,u(xt )]
t =1

subject to
stk = (1  d)stk1 + it , t  1
ct + it = f (stk , xtc )

, t 1

(P1)

(program E)

(P2)

kxte1 = xt  xtc + xte + xtl , t  1
where  = 1  p.

(P3)

The two key parameters that appear in the analysis of these programs are k and  .
As we have discussed, and following Stern, an appropriate value for  is gotten by using
the discount rate of 0.001 per annum and compounding this to give a generational
 1 
discount factor of  = 
 1.001 

25

= 0.975 .

An appropriate value for k is 20; about 5%

of the labor force is involved in teaching the next generation, and so we may say that one
unit of skilled teaching labor produces twenty units of skill in the next generation (this
assumes that skill is not increasing with time).
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These programs are simpler to analyze than the fully articulated program with
emissions and global warming, described in section 4, but we hope, by studying them,
to gain some intuition for what may be the case with the three analogues of these
programs, when the set of feasible paths involves the full complexity of emissions, the
quality of the biosphere, and the production of knowledge.
I now summarize some of the results of LRSb, which studies programs SUS, DU,
and E. The first question to answer is: When does the DU program diverge? A program
diverges if there are feasible paths where the objective function has an infinite value. If
this is the case, there are usually many feasible paths for which the infinite value occurs,
and we then must adopt some other method for assessing the relative desirability of these
various paths. Clearly the most desirable path must be one of these (since any one
dominates any path giving a finite value to the objective), but how do we choose among
them? More on this below.
We have:
Result 1. The DU program diverges if and only if  k > 1 .
If we choose parameters  = 0.975 and k  20 , which I have argued may be reasonable,
then the DU program would surely diverge.
The second result is quite remarkable; it states

Result 2 If the DU program diverges, then the feasible path that solves SUS is also the
feasible path that solves E.

In particular, although the DU program may diverge, the SUS program never
diverges: regardless of the value of the parameters ( , k) there is a well-defined solution
of SUS.

Result 2 states that if  k > 1 then the sustainabilitarian ethical observer, who

accepts the uncertainty of the existence of future generations, can nevertheless ignore this
uncertainty, in the sense that the solution to the program E with which she is concerned is
exactly the same as the solution the program SUS, which ignores the uncertainty!
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What is the intuition behind this result? If the DU program diverges – that is, if

 k > 1 -- it is, intuitively, because the educational technology is highly productive, that
is, because k is ‘large.’ Now when the sustainabilitarian takes account of uncertainty, she
wants, at first blush, possibly to reduce the amount of resources allocated to generations
very far in the future, because there is a substantial probability that these generations will
not exist (and so it would be a waste, perhaps, to provide for them).

But if the

educational technology is sufficiently productive, she need not economize in this way.
Put another way, the only time she would rationally reduce resources allocated to
generations far in the future is if the educational technology where not very productive.
If you will, a large value of k trumps the uncertainty involved in the possible nonexistence of future generations: a large k makes society so ‘wealthy’ that it can afford to
ignore the possible waste of resources on future generations who turn out not to exist.
We finally confront the issue of what the utilitarian Ethical Observer should
recommend in the case that the DU program diverges. We must adopt some rule for
comparing feasible paths which give an infinite value to the DU program – for surely, as
we said, it is among these paths that the EO must choose.

Economists have proposed

choosing among these paths by employing an overtaking criterion. There are a number
of overtaking criteria proposed in the literature. The most recent such proposal is by
Basu and Mitra (2007), who propose that a feasible path of amenity vectors, which we
will denote {z(t) | t = 1, 2,...} is at least as desirable as a feasible path of amenity vectors

{ẑ(t) | t = 1, 2,...} if and only if:
T

T

t =1

t =1

(T )(  T 1u(z(t))    T 1u( ẑ(t))) and

.

(t > T  u(z(t))  u( ẑ(t)))

In English, this says that the sum of discounted utilities up to some date T on the first
path is at least as large as that sum for the second path, and for dates later than T, the
utility of every generation on the first path is at least as large as the utility on the second
path.
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The Basu-Mitra criterion induces a partial ordering of paths for which DU
diverges, not a complete ordering. Nevertheless, it is an appealing proposal. What are its
consequences for our problem? One can show:

Result 3. If {z(t)} is a path upon which the quality of life eventually grows at a rate g,
and if {ẑ(t)} is a path at which the quality of life eventually grows at rate ĝ , and g > ĝ ,
then the path {z(t)} is more desirable than the path {ẑ(t)} according to the Basu-Mitra
overtaking criterion.

Now if path {z(t)} eventually grows faster than path {ẑ(t)} , that must be because
resources have been transferred away from early generations towards future generations
in the path {z(t)} compared to the path {ẑ(t)} – that is the early generations consume
less and work harder to accumulate capital that benefits the future generations. In other
words, if the DU program diverges, then the utilitarian ethical observer recommends
paths that reduce the quality of life to the lowest possible levels for early generations,
entailing the highest possible rate of growth of quality-of-life for later generations.
(Indeed, there is no ‘best’ path according to the Basu-Mitra criterion, but we can say that
some paths are more desirable than others, and ones which are high on desirability almost
starve the early generations.) In contrast, what does the sustainabilitarian do when DU
diverges? She recommends the path that equalizes the quality-of-life for all future
generations (even if, ex post, at some point, they will turn out not to exist) at the highest
possible such level.
Now let us return to the problem of global warming, which interests us. By
analogy, we conjecture that the DU program where global warming is taken into account
will diverge. That is, we conjecture that, even if we constrain emissions not to be so
great as to engender unacceptably high global temperatures, the process of technological
innovation and the productivity of the education technology will allow us to construct
feasible paths upon which the discounted sum of qualities of life will be infinite – and
this claim depends, as well, on our view that the value of  should be very close to one.
This would mean that the discounted-utilitarian, if she invokes a Basu-Mitra overtaking
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criterion to compare feasible paths, must recommend starving early generations in favor
of generating high rates of growth of the quality-of-life for the distant future. In contrast,
the sustainabilitiarian , by Result 2, even acknowledging uncertainty, will recommend the
path which equalizes the quality-of-life for all generations at the highest possible level,
even though, at some date, those generations will, with probability approaching one, not
exist.

8. Intra-temporal resource allocation
Suppose that we have solved the intertemporal problem and therefore know what
total emissions should be for the present generation and the next one, the next fifty years.
We know as well what total production of commodities should be and what total
consumption should be for these generations. How should that production be allocated to
the various regions/countries of the world, and how should consumption be allocated to
those regions/countries?
This is a huge topic, and our team (LRS) plans to study it in the future. In order
to influence global negotiations over the rights to emit GHGs, it is tempting to take into
account, at least to some extent, political reality. For instance, the naïve cosmopolitan
approach, of advocating an equal per capita distribution of global consumption, while
perhaps ethically attractive, is probably not be politically realistic.
Table 3 presents the per capita emissions of tons of CO2 and the fraction of total
emissions coming various areas of the world in 2008:
Country
United States
EU15
China
India
Russia
Japan
Brazil

Per capita emissions (tons)
19.4
8.6
5.1
1.8
11.8
9.8
2.0

Percent world total
21.4%
12.0%
24.3%
7.5%
6.1%
4.5%
1.4%

Table 3: Global per capita emissions of carbon dioxide in 2008
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To approximately stabilize the CO2e concentration at 500 ppm by 2050, taking into
account a projected global population of nine billion people, would require reducing
emissions to 2 tons per capita. Among the developed countries, clearly the EU15 and
Japan are in a better position than the US and Russia to reach this target. It is reasonable
to suppose that the solution of the intertemporal problem will require the next two
generations not to exceed the level of 500 ppm, and hence to emit no more than two tons
per person CO2e by 2050. Indeed, many climate scientists believe that 500 ppm CO2e is
far too high.
Here we indicate the kind of considerations concerning intratemporal distribution
that come into play with a simple model. Suppose a ‘reasonable’ target is that per capita
consumption be the same in China/India in 2050 as in the US/EU15. If this is not
politically reasonable, at least it may be ethically reasonable. (Of course, what becomes
politically reasonably depends upon how well the global population understands the
ethics.) Suppose that the manufacturing production in both the South and the North is
governed by a production function F(K, L, E) where K is capital stock, L is the size of
the labor force, and E is the amount of emissions. F is increasing in all three arguments –
in particular, the more emissions permitted, the greater will output be for a given capitallabor endowment, because constraining emissions requires spending resources (capital
and labor) to reduce them. What differentiates the South and the North is the capital
labor ratio K / L , which is greater in the North than in the South.
I will discuss two possible cases. The first is that there is no North-South transfer
of consumption – that is, no subsidy to the South by the North8. In this case, the problem
is to compute the emission levels of the South and the North (ES and EN ) which will
engender equal per-capita consumption at the highest possible level, subject to not
exceeding the ‘total-emissions budget’ of E , allocated to the generation in question by
the solution of the intergenerational welfare maxmization problem.

Assume that the

capital stocks and labor forces in the South and North are given by

8

By a transfer of output, I do not mean international trade, which is a quid pro quo. I
mean a gift or subsidy: that one area transfers output to another without a reverse transfer.
In this simple model with only one produced commodity, there is no scope for trade,
which can only occur if different regions produce different commodities.
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(K N , LN ) and (K S , LS ) . We simplify by assuming capital does not depreciate, and the
entire output is used for consumption. We may write the program as follows:
choose ES , EN , and y to maximize y subject to:
F(K N , LN , EN ) / LN = y
F(K S , LS , ES ) / LS = y

Program SN1

E N + ES = E

Here y is the (equal) per capita consumption (that is, output divided by labor force) of the
South and the North. The first two constraints state that each area of the world consumes
its own output – that is, no transfers occur – and that consumption per capita is the same
in both. It is easy to see that, if F exhibits constant-returns to scale, then the solution to
Program SN1 entails:

ES E N
;
>
LS L N
that is, the South should pollute more tons per capita than the North.
Now consider a second case, where transfers of output may occur. Then the
problem is to allocate emissions to the South and North so as to maximize total
production subject to the emission budget, and then divide the output in an equal-per
capita fashion. Now the problem is:
choose EN , ES , and y to maximize F(K N , LN , EN ) + F(K S , LS , ES )
subject to EN + ES = E .

Program SN2

The qualitative nature of the solution to this problem cannot be stated without further
knowledge of the function F. In particular, if capital and emissions are substitutes in
production (which is a condition on a second partial derivative of F) then the solution of
SN2 requires more emissions per capita in the South; however, if they are complements in
production, it requires more emissions per capita in the North9.
The important conceptual point here is that our ethical views may be linked to a
conception of equal rights to welfare or to quality of life, which in the very simple model
just discussed is taken to mean equal consumption of the emissions-producing

9

This analysis is due to J. Silvestre.
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manufactured commodity.

China’s claim, that it should be allowed to pollute more per

capita than the North, may be ethically justified: the details depend upon the nature of the
manufacturing technology and on the assumptions we make about the degree of interregional transfers.
Finally, we present a model which is more politically realistic, in that it does not
aim at equalizing consumption per capita in the South and the North, and it introduces a
market for pollution permits. (In the two models above, markets were not introduced:
these were purely physical models about desirable outcomes, whose results do not
depend upon any institutional setting – markets, central plans, or whatever.)

We

continue to suppose that the target of international negotiations is to achieve a total
amount of pollution of E in tons of CO2 e .

We assume (that is: we propose) that

international negotiations should focus upon one parameter, the relative per capita
consumption of the South to the North, a fraction a. For instance, this parameter might
be reasonably arrived at by computing what the per capita consumptions of the two
regions would be in 2050 if there were no constraint with respect to carbon emissions.
The parties agree that the ratio of these two numbers should be the target for the relative
per capita consumptions of the two regions, when emissions are constrained.

Suppose

this ratio is a. The problem is to allocate pollution permits to the two regions – which
can either be used by the home region or sold to the other region—in order that, at the
market equilibrium, the ratio of per capita consumptions will be a. This is a problem
where there is one degree of freedom – the choice of the volume of pollution permits to
be allocated to the South (which then determines what must be allocated to the North).
There is one target, the ratio a. So for a set of possible values for a, it will be possible to
solve the problem. One number that will appear as part of the market equilibrium is a
price,  , at which pollution permits trade between the two regions: this price will equate
the supply and demand for permits in the two regions.
The details of this computation need not detain us here. The important points are
these:
•

the focus of international negotiations should be on the parameter a; the eventual
decision on the pollution permits given to the two regions will follow from the
choice of this ethical/political parameter;

40
•

if the North transfers output to the South, the mechanism will be through the
North’s purchasing pollution permits from the South. Pollution permits will be
purchased by transfers of the commodity in the reverse direction, where the rate
of exchange between permits and commodity is .

In particular, it follows from the first bullet that there can be no a priori supposition that
the formula “allocate pollution permits so that each region has the same rights to pollute
tons of CO2 e per capita” is correct. The fundamental ethical and political considerations
are not based upon a ‘resource-egalitarian’ approach to property rights in pollution
permits, but rather on a target for relative consumptions (or welfares) of the different
regions of the world.
The discussion among economists, and between economists and the public, is
often phrased in terms of finding the right ‘social cost’ of carbon emissions. This is
somewhat confusing. The correct social cost of carbon emissions is the equilibrium price

 determined by the model just discussed: and in general it will depend upon the
political agreement on a that is reached in the international negotiations. Thus, the social
cost of carbon does not derive simply from objective facts about the world -- that is,
from technological and physical/biological data -- it is the consequence of those physical
constraints together with a theory of the just way to allocate resources over the
generations, which determines the carbon budget of the present generation, and a
political-ethical resolution of the intra-generational allocation problem (that is, an
agreement on a) . That price, in other words, has as much a political-ethical component
as a technological-physical one. Economists mislead the public when they imply that
there is a correct social cost to carbon emissions, which is independent of ethical
judgments about inter- and intra-temporal resource allocation.

9. Conclusion
Our main conclusions are these:
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1. Solving the problem of the just intertemporal amenity path for a society consisting of
many generations requires the maximization of a social welfare function10 provided by a
theory of justice, subject to constraints provided by facts about the world.
2. Two major weaknesses exist in current economic analysis of this problem: first, the
analyses almost always assume that the correct intergenerational ethic is utilitarianism,
and second, the modification to discounted utilitarianism is often based on the ethical
view that the decision problem for a society with many generations is ethically equivalent
to the decision problem of an infinitely-lived consumer.
3. The two main approaches for determining what the discount rate should be are that of
maximizing the utility of the present generation as a proxy for society ( Approach A) ,
and that of the uncertainty of the existence of future generations (Approach B). We argue
that only method B is ethically valid.

Consequently, the discount factor (discount rate)

that most analyses have adopted is far too small (respectively, large).
4. Intergenerational maximin, or sustainability of welfare, is arguably a more attractive
ethic than utilitarianism. Maximizing a sustainabilitarian objective will give quite
different policy recommendations from maximizing a discounted utilitarian one.
5. If Approach B is adopted as the justification of discounting, and if the technology is
sufficiently productive, then the discounted utilitarian program diverges. In this case, the
solution of the discounted sustainabilitarian program is exactly the same as the solution
of the undiscounted sustainabilitarian program. In other words, the sustainabilitarian
ethical observer can ignore the kind of uncertainty discussed in approach B.
6. A consumptionist fallacy is prevalent in intergenerational welfare analysis, which
conceptualizes human welfare as a function only of commodity consumption. This limits
seriously the avenues for maintaining or increasing welfare.
7. Based upon parameterization of a model in which the consumptionist fallacy is
avoided, by recognizing that educated leisure, quality of the biosphere, and knowledge
are direct goods in producing a Quality of Life, we estimate that to achieve welfare
sustainability at the highest possible levels, we should be investing at a considerably
higher rate in capital and knowledge than we currently are. If our conjectures about high

10

More generally, choosing among paths of infinite utility streams.
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productivity are correct, this policy recommendation holds even if we are uncertain about
the existence of future generations (see point 5).
8. If the discounted utilitarian program diverges, and the utilitarian ethical observer
adopts an overtaking criterion to order amenity paths, she will recommend virtual
starvation of early generations in order to maximize the long-term rate of growth of
welfare for later generations – even though very late generations may not exist.
9. Regarding the intratemporal problem, we argued that the superficially attractive idea
of allocating carbon-emission permits to regions to equalize per capita emissions per
citizen across regions is not, in fact, correct. The fundamental variable is the target level
of relative welfare (very simply, of relative consumption) between the regions of the
world. Once an ethical theory (or international negotiations) has fixed this parameter,
then the allocation of carbon-emission permits to the regions will follow, and it will only
be a singular case in which emission permits per citizen are equalized across regions.
There is no convincing sense in which the allocation pattern of those permits should be
viewed as an ethical primitive.
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Table 1: An approximate solution to the sustainabilitarian program
Gen

 t /  t  t /  t 1
0

ct

ct / ct 1

xte

xtc

xtn

it

xtl

stk

stn

2000
1

1.
1.3110

1.
1.3110

23.88
40.399

1.6917

0.04653
0.04660

0.3955
0.4779

0.0233
0.0608

0.9307
1.0643

7.59
14.02

73.65
199.62

15.64
39.72

2
3

1.3110
1.3111

1.
1.0000

37.931
31.759

0.9390
0.8373

0.05138
0.05138

0.4444
0.5129

0.0586
0.0572

1.0977
1.2000

8.14
8.95

149.26
149.26

43.48
43.48

4

1.3111

1

31.759

1

0.0513
8

0.5129

0.0572

1.2000

8.95

149.26

43.48

xte (%)

xtc (%)

Gen
2000
1
2
3
4

0.0333
0.0282
0.0311
0.0282
0.0282

0.2833
0.2897
0.2690
0.2815
0.2815

xtn (%)
0.0167
0.0369
0.0355
0.0314
0.0314

xtl (%)
0.6667
0.6452
0.6645
0.6588
0.6588

 t = Quality of Life at date t
ct = commodity consumption at date t
xte = skilled labor in teaching at date t
xtc = skilled labor in commodity production at date t
xtn = skilled labor in commodity production at date t
xtn = skilled labor in commodity production at date t
xtn = skilled labor in the research/knowledge industry at date t
xtl = skill units of leisure at date t
it = investment at date t
stk = capital stock at date t
stn = stock of knowledge at date t

xt
1.396
1.650
1.652
1.821
1.821
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Table 2 An approximate solution to the human-development program with generational
growth rate of 28%
Gen

 t /  t  t /  t 1
0

2000
1
2
3
4

1.
1.2999
1.6671
2.1380
2.7418

1.
1.2999
1.2824
1.2824
1.2824

ct
23.88
40.056
48.281
51.993
66.829

ct / ct 1
1.6774
1.2054
1.0769
1.2853

xte

xtc

xtn

xtl

it

stk

stn

0.04653
0.06043
0.08548
0.10987
0.14122

0.3955
0.4737
0.5779
0.8544
1.0982

0.0233
0.0603
0.0796
0.1004
0.1290

0.9307
1.0552
1.3994
1.9656
2.5265

7.59
13.89
11.53
15.81
20.32

73.65
197.88
193.38
248.56
319.48

15.64
39.38
55.98
71.95
92.48

Gen

xte (%)

xtc (%)

xtn (%)

xtl (%)

xt

2000
1
2
3
4

0.0333
0.0366
0.0399
0.0363
0.0363

0.2833
0.2872
0.2697
0.2819
0.2819

0.01667
0.03654
0.03715
0.03313
0.03313

0.6667
0.6397
0.6532
0.6486
0.6486

1.396
1.649
2.142
3.030
3.895
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Figure 1 Flows in the model of section 5

